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ABSTRACT
From 1986 through 1997 the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized
by a centralized clearinghouse. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a decentralized market in
which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment. The career
paths of gastroenterologists therefore offer a unique opportunity to examine the difference between the
market when appointments are decentralized and early, versus when they are made later via a centralized
clearinghouse. (Most centralized clearinghouses remain in use once established, and so there is no way
to separate changes due to the clearinghouse from other changes that may have taken place over time.)
We find that, both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used,
gastroenterologists are less mobile, and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they
were internal medicine residents, than when the clearinghouse was in use. This suggests that the
clearinghouse serves not only to coordinate the timing of appointments, but that it also increases the scope
of the market, compared to decentralized markets with early appointments and exploding offers. This has
implications for theories of market failure due to unraveling over time.
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A common feature of many entry level labor markets is the "unraveling" of hiring
decisions.  At some point in the history of such markets, contracts come to be written
quite far before actual employment starts. Two markets that are presently experiencing
this kind of unraveling are the market for law clerks for Federal appellate judges (cf.
Avery, Jolls, Posner and Roth 2001), in which offers are presently made almost two years
in advance of employment, and the market for college admissions (cf. Avery, Fairbanks
and Zeckhauser 2001), in which elite colleges admit a high percentage of their entering
classes through "early decision" programs that require applicants to commit in advance to
one college that they will accept its offer if they are admitted early.  Roth and Xing
(1994) describe several dozen such markets and submarkets.
Unraveling is typically a dynamic process, so that offers are made earlier and
earlier from year to year. Furthermore, markets that experience unraveling tend to be
markets in which applicants receive “exploding” or “short fuse” offers. That means an
applicant has to accept or reject such an offer before she can gather all (or sometimes
any) other offers she might receive from potential employers. In such a market, any firm
that leaves its offers open for even a little time, and is eventually rejected, will often find
that their alternative choices have already accepted offers elsewhere. Therefore, firms
have an incentive to make exploding offers themselves, and the trend towards making
exploding offers becomes self reinforcing.
Unraveling in a market can potentially impose two kinds of costs. There are the
costs of potential mismatches, if information about the quality of applicants (and firms)
only becomes available over time (so that there is important information that is3
unavailable when contracts are signed early than if they were signed later).
1 "Exploding"
offers may bring about another source of inefficiency. In a world of exploding offers,
firms enjoy local market power (in time) and this may lead to mismatches (Roth and
Xing 1997).
In many markets there have been vigorous and sustained efforts to halt the
unraveling of appointment dates. However, efforts to simply impose uniform
appointment dates have most often been unsuccessful. Some markets have successfully
reorganized themselves around a centralized clearinghouse (Roth and Xing 1994). The
best known example is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), through which
20,000 entry level medical positions are filled each year in the United States (cf. Roth,
1984, Roth and Peranson, 1999).  Other examples include a variety of American medical
and health care markets, entry level medical markets in Britain and Canada, and entry
level markets for law graduates in some regions of Canada.
Because it is difficult to directly measure the qualities of a particular worker-firm
match, let alone the efficiency of a matching of workers and firms at the market level,
there has been no direct evidence bearing on the costs of unraveling, apart from
experimental studies (Kagel and Roth 2000, Haruvy, Roth, and Ünver 2001).
2 There is
not even clear nonexperimental evidence that a centralized clearinghouse produces
different matches than those observed in an unraveled decentralized market.  The present
                                                          
1 This includes information about future demand, as well as information about the professional
qualifications of the applicants and their preferences.
2 For example, Avery et al. (2001) discuss the difficulty of assessing the efficiency of different matchings
of law clerks to federal judges, since there is no way to even begin to measure how this enters into the
production of justice or social welfare.  Similarly, we would not know how to begin to assess how different
matchings of gastroenterology fellows and hospitals enter into the production of good health and social
welfare.4
paper will present direct evidence of this latter sort, which also has a bearing on the costs
of unraveling.
Recent theoretical work by Li and Rosen(1998), Li and Suen (2000), and Suen
(2000) has shown how unraveling can occur in competitive markets.  In these models, the
market is competitive not only when it is organized through a centralized clearinghouse
(or a decentralized market) at a uniform, efficient time, but also when the market
unravels, and clears inefficiently early. In these models, the costs of unraveling arise as
costs of mismatching due to the fact that there remains uncertainty over applicants’ (or
firms’) quality when contracts are written far in advance. In this case early contracts can
provide insurance for risk averse market participants.
3  In general, parties that contract
early benefit from unraveling, while others might be worse off. Unraveling is ex ante
efficient, but ex post inefficient, due to the mismatches from forming early contracts. In
such models a centralized clearinghouse may be introduced for two reasons. One
possibility is that firms simply form a cartel. By having applicants match to firms via a
centralized clearinghouse, firms may not have to compete for applicants by paying them
competitive wages (see also Kamecke 1998). Another possibility is that those parties that
suffer early contracting are able to enforce a uniform late contract date, in which
mandatory participation in a centralized clearinghouse serves as an enforcement device.
                                                          
3 Specifically Li and Rosen model uncertainty over applicants’ qualifications and uncertainty over
aggregate supply (i.e. whether the applicants or the firms will be on the long side of the market). Early
contracting can then provide partial insurance for both the ex ante promising (but maybe still ex post
unqualified) applicant, and the firm. Li and Suen show that aggregate uncertainty is not necessary for such
results. They assume uncertainty about applicants’ and firms’ quality, and complementarities between those
qualities. When workers and firms are symmetric, early contracting provides risk sharing regarding the
uncertain future productivity and happens among ex ante highly productive firms and applicants (“top-
clearing contracting”). When applicants are risk averse but firms are risk neutral, there can be equilibria in
which promising workers (who care about risk-sharing), but not promising firms (who care more about
sorting efficiency) contract early.5
Roth and Xing (1994) identify an additional potential cost of unraveling, namely
that as markets unravel, they become thinner and less competitive, as different firms
make offers at different times. By making exploding offers, firms limit the options of
applicants to consider alternative offers and hence can exercise local market power. (See
for example the description of the contemporary market for law clerks in Avery et al.
2001.) According to this hypothesis, this loss of liquidity in the market reduces the scope
of the market, and forces firms to rely more on local applicants. For example, in the
United Kingdom, when the market for entry level medical positions unraveled to over a
year before students graduated from medical school, positions at teaching hospitals
seemed often to be filled with students from the associated medical school (Roth 1990,
1991). In Japan, early recruiting is often accomplished through informal "old boys"
networks, in which graduates from a given university are recruited by former students of
that university (Roth and Xing 1994, Rebick, 2000). If unraveling causes the market to
become thin in this way, a centralized clearinghouse can then help not only to stop the
unraveling and control the timing of the market, it may additionally increase the scope of
the market,  and reduce the need for market participants to rely on informal networks.
To summarize, both competitive and noncompetitive models of unraveling imply
ex post inefficiency of the market. However, efficiency of a match is difficult to observe
in the field (as opposed to in experiments). The main difference between the “purely
competitive” and noncompetitive hypotheses is whether a centralized clearinghouse
solely regulates the timing at which the market takes place. In the existing competitive
models, the market is competitive at whatever time it operates. An alternative hypothesis,
suggested by descriptive accounts of some deeply unraveled markets with exploding6
offers, etc. is that they limit the scope of the market—i.e. the range of offers and
candidates that can be considered.  In that case the centralized clearinghouse may also
reduce local market power, lead to more liquidity and increase the scope of the market.
In the present paper, we will look for evidence that a centralized clearinghouse
affects the scope of the market, by examining the career-paths of market participants,
with and without a centralized match.  The idea is to see if, without a centralized match,
employers are able to cast as wide a net as when there is a centralized match.  The
alternate hypothesis is that a centralized match supports a national market, while an
unraveled market is likely to break down into many local markets.
There is a considerable difficulty in finding data that address this question.  For
example, we cannot simply look at the career paths of American doctors before and after
the introduction of the first centralized match in 1951.  Many other changes in the
medical profession and the general economy have influenced the mobility of physicians
since that time, so even if we find that physicians are less likely to take their first job at a
local hospital since the introduction of the match, this could hardly be counted as
evidence that this was due to introduction of the centralized clearinghouse.
Ideally we would like to consider a profession in which we have observations
both before a centralized match was instituted and after it was removed, to be able to
attribute different career paths to changes in the matching mechanism and not to changes
due to changes over time in the way a profession is organized.
The internal medicine subspecialty of Gastroenterology provides us with such a
unique opportunity. As will be described below, Gastroenterology had a centralized
match from 1986 to 1997, and an unraveled, decentralized market both before and since.7
Thus the mobility of entry-level gastroenterologists can be tracked over time, and the
effects of both the introduction of a centralized clearinghouse, and its demise, can be
observed.
Our results show a significant increase in mobility of Gastroenterology fellows
during the match, both compared to before the match was in place and after the demise of
the match. This provides the first evidence that the use of a centralized clearinghouse
leads to different matchings, and that unraveling may reduce the scope of the market.
Gastroenterology
Gastroenterology is a subspecialty of internal medicine. A typical GI fellow (so
called because of the older name of Gastro-Intestinal disease) will therefore have first
gone 4 years to college, then 4 years to medical school, then been employed for 3 years
as a resident in internal medicine (qualifying to be a Board certified specialist in internal
medicine), and finally started a GI fellowship, at the end of which he will be eligible to
be a Board certified subspecialist. GI fellowship positions were allocated via a
decentralized market until 1985.  Like many medical markets and submarkets (Roth and
Xing, 1994) it suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates, and attempted a
number of solutions prior to adopting a centralized match.
4  In 1986 the Medical
Specialties Matching Program (MSMP) was initiated by the NRMP at the request of the
                                                          
4 For example, Dr. David Brenner, then Chair of the AGA’s Manpower and Training Committee, in an
interview in Spring 1999, in the Trainee and Young GI News of the American Gastroeterology association:
“Before the match, an approach of setting guidelines for interviewing candidates and negotiating positions
was tried, and it was unsuccessful. Some applicants and programs received calls asking them for decisions
three months before the deadline. Since it was only a recommended policy, directors say, it was terribly
abused, which is why the training directors developed the match. Many felt that there was a chaotic
atmosphere.”8
Association of Professors of Medicine, the Association of Program Directors in Internal
Medicine and the Council of Sub-Specialty Societies of the American College of
Physicians. From 1989 the match was conducted for Gastroenterology, Cardiovascular
Disease, Pulmonary Disease and since 1994 also for Infectious Disease (all internal
medicine subspecialties.) The objective was to establish a uniform appointment date for
internal medicine fellowship positions which would permit applicants to complete at least
two years of their residency before making a decision as to which sub-specialty to pursue.
The fellowship clearinghouse was conducted a year in advance, i.e. after two years of
internal medicine residency, and one year before employment would begin (MSMP
1999).
In such a clearinghouse, applicants and hospitals submit rank order lists over
positions and applicants, respectively. Then the deferred acceptance algorithm, with
hospitals proposing is used. This produces stable matchings (cf. Gale and Shaply, 1962,
Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). However, in the years 1997 to 1999 the centralized match
suffered from defections, broke down, and was abandoned. The demise of the match can
be clearly seen in the number of positions that were filled through the match each year:
While in 1996 around 300 positions participated in the match, by 1999 there were only 14
and in 2000 there was no match for Gatroenterologists.
The demise of the match seems to have been set in motion in 1993-1994, when, in
the midst of general discussions of health care reform, the subspecialty of
Gastroenterology subjected itself to a manpower analysis. The resulting study was
published in 1996 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (Meyer et al
1996). Its main conclusions are that the US health care system and gastroenterologists9
would benefit from a reduction in gastroenterology Fellowship programs.
5 The
Gastroenterology Leadership Council endorsed a goal of 25% to 50% reduction in the
number of GI fellows over 5 years. Furthermore, an additional year of training was
mandated: starting in the summer of 1996, three years of training were required to be
board eligible, instead of two.
That is, starting in 1996 the demand for gastroenerology fellows was sharply
reduced, by administrative decision of the specialty board, and the cost of becoming a
gastroenterologist was raised by a year (although some three-year fellowship programs
had already existed before 1996).
However, this triggered an even sharper reduction in the number of residents who
applied for GI fellowship positions and seems to have been the starting point of the
demise of the match. In 1996, for the first time, and despite the reduction in the number
of positions offered, there were fewer applicants for GI fellowship positions than there
were positions offered in the match.  This seems to have triggered a scramble among
fellowship programs that led to the demise of the match.  Dr. David Brenner, then Chair
of the AGA’s Manpower and Training Committee, in an interview in Spring 1999, AGA:
Trainee and Young GI News, described that demise in part as follows:
“Last year, several applicants complained because many training programs
did not use the match. Many applicants were un-aware of this change and they felt
that they had missed opportunities. Training-program directors who used the
match felt that they had lost applicants to programs that had secured fellows
before the match. Many applicants and a large percentage of the fellowship
                                                          
5  The cartel-like aspects of medical specialty boards in their role of deciding how many entry level
positions to accredit each year is beyond the scope of the present paper.10
programs stopped using the match, which made choices more difficult for the
remaining applicants and programs and created a vicious circle. Many training
directors were very disappointed a few years ago when they didn’t fill their slots
because the applicants they thought were interested accepted positions before the
match.”
The following table shows for each year in which the match took place (one year
before the fellowship starts), the results of the match. It gives the number of positions and






















‘92 377 96.6 160 658 1.75
‘93 374 -25 -0.067 399 94 173 642 1.6
‘94 369 93 169 591 1.6
‘95 351 14 0.04 337 88.7 171 433 1.3
‘96 313 15 0.048 298 74.8 164 277 0.9
‘97 254 41 0.161 213 85 128 240 1.1
‘98 178 79 0.443 99 77.8 60 148 1.5
‘99 35 21 0.6 14 11
Table 1: For each year, Positions advertised is the number of positions whose availability in the match was
announced in late March. Until late May, the programs may add or withdraw positions (Posts withdrawn),
which leaves the final number of positions in the match (Posts in Match.) # Applicants is the total number
of applicants that listed at least one GE program in their rank order list.11
As noted above, 1996 was the first year that the total number of applicants for
Gastroenterology fellowship positions was lower than the total number of positions
offered, with a ratio of 0.9. Only 75% of the positions that participated in the MSMP got
matched that year, a considerable reduction from previous years. 1997 was the first year
in which a large percentage of positions withdrew from the match, presumably in part
because they noticed that the market was starting to unravel, and moved early to assure
themselves of filling their positions with qualified applicants.  We will view 1997 as the
first year in which the market was no longer effectively organized via the centralized
match. (That is, GI fellows who began employment in 1998 and hence finish in 2001 will
have obtained their job after the match had started to break down).
Once the match broke down, and the commitment to uniform late appointment
dates vanished, the market for Gastroenterology fellows once again experienced
unraveling and exploding offers. The following quotes, all from the leading field journal
Gastroenterology in 1999, make this clear.
6
In a Letter GI Fellows Bauer, Fackler, Kongara, Matteoni, Shen and Vaezi (1999)
comment on the effects of the demise of the match.
“Of recent concern is the deterioration of the match process for candidates
applying for fellowship positions over the past two years. Our junior colleagues
are concerned that they may not be able to wait safely to interview with the
institution of their choice while a position is offered elsewhere early in the
                                                          
6 The Organization that organizes the Match, NRMP, also changed its policy, presumably to forestall
similar breakdowns in other fields. Effective July 1, 2001, NRMP requires the sponsoring organization to
sign an “NRMP Program Directors Annual Participation Agreement” annually committing active
participation of at least 75% of the eligible programs and a minimum of 75% of all available positions in
the specialty for a given year. Subsequent failure to register 75% of programs and/or positions in a given
year jeopardizes the NRMP’s managing future matches.12
decision process. The absence of the match benefits the programs a great deal
more than their applicants.”
Gorelick (1999) in a Comment from the Editors, speculates about the reasons of
the demise of the match, and confirms unraveling.
“The reasons for the decline of the match include fewer applicants to the
Gastroenterology Match, and the inopportune timing of interviews and the Match.
This year the reduced applicant pool led to earlier interviews and the virtual
abandonment of the Match.
 This downward trend in applicants to GI programs may have reversed
this year and may remain stable for the foreseeable future. However, the
movement toward earlier interview dates is likely to continue. Indeed some
programs will be conducting their interviews almost 2 years before the trainee’s
start date”.
7
The market also experiences some of the other “typical” costs associated with
unraveling, apart from mismatching. The first is that when the time comes to begin
employment, some applicants fail to fulfill their obligation, made two years in advance,
to join the program whose offer they have accepted. Second, internal medicine residents
may not want to consider Gastroenterology, because they are not willing to commit to a
                                                          
7 Furthermore, applicants are usually in the midst of difficult and sleep-depriving rotations characteristic of
their second year residency. In an interview, one fellowship director indicated that an additional
disadvantage of interviewing so far in advance is that applicants tend to fall asleep during the interview.13
subspecialty this early. Interviews now take place before they have the opportunity to
explore other subspecialties (Gorelick 1999).
8
The data
We purchased from the American Medical Association (via Medical Marketing
Service, Inc.) a dataset that contains all living physicians who either have completed, or
are currently completing a Gastroenterology fellowship, are board certified
gastroenterologists or claim Gastroenterology as a specialty.  For each physician we
obtained information on the career path, i.e. the medical school they attended, and the
residencies and fellowships they completed. The data specifically contain the years in
which each physician graduated from medical school and finished each residency, the
specialty of the residency (e.g. Internal Medicine, Gastroenterology), the name of the
institution where the residency was done, and the city and the state of the institution.
The file contains 15,187 entries. Of those, 10881 have been or are enrolled in a
Gastroenterology (GI) fellowship.
9 Of these 10881 with a GI fellowship, 10553 also
completed a residency (in the US) before their GI fellowship. The largest number of
active gastroenterologists completed their fellowships after 1977, from which point on
there were at least  260  physicians completing a GI  fellowship.  Only 177 physicians
completed a GI fellowship in 1976 and fewer than 100 per year for all the years before
that. Furthermore, our data are incomplete for the most recent years: Our last observation
will be 2003 (date of completion of fellowship), for which we have 156 fellows (whereas
                                                          
8 Indeed, a survey of internal medicine residents indicates that 2/3 of residents feel that they are not ready to
make a decision to commit to a subspecialty fellowship in their second year and would prefer to delay that
decision until their third year (AGA 2001).14
we have only 5 fellows in 2004),
10 see Figure 1. We will compare the mobility of
physicians between the last residency before their GI residency and their first GI
residency (a few have two). In our results the year of the GI residency always refers to
the year in which the GI fellowship is to be completed.
11
Figure 1: For each year, the number of presently active physicians who finished (or will finish)
their GI fellowship in that year. The match was instituted in 1986, for positions starting in 1987,
lasting two years hence finishing in 1989. Analogously the match broke down in 1997, with
fellowships now lasting three years, so 2000 marks the demise of the match. The year 2003 is
represented by a hollow point, since our data set may not contain all such fellows.
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 Of the residual 4306 people, 3177 are actually board certified, the others only claim Gastroenterology as a
specialty.
10 The physicians who finish their GI fellowship in 2003 (and hence mostly started in 2000) are as yet
incompletely reported in our data set. The fellowship positions are reported by the hospitals, and entered by
the American Medical Association, a process which takes some time.
11 Note that the number of fellows does not match the number of positions offered through the match. This
reflects that even when the match was in place, some positions were filled outside the match. Also, the
length of positions is not necessarily the minimum number of required years. For example, 45% of
positions were 3 year positions in 1993, when the requirement to be board eligible was still only 2 years
(Meyer et al 1996).
For each year the number of GI fellows in our data   
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The vertical lines correspond to the introduction, and the demise of the match,
respectively. The first match was in 1986, for positions that start in 1987 and last (in
general) 2 years, i.e. fellows who finish in 1989. Analogously, as described above, we
consider the year of 1997 as the first year in which a large number of positions were
filled outside the match, these are fellows who start their residency in 1998, and, the
requirement now being 3 years, finish in 2001.
This leaves us with 9180 fellows who did GI fellowships in 433 different hospital
codes coming from 680 places.
12
Mobility of Gastroenterologists with and without a Match
Our main objective in this paper is to investigate whether the use of a centralized
clearinghouse to match GI fellows to hospitals has an effect on the resulting matching of
applicants to hospitals. Our data allow us to measure changes in the scope of the market.
We compare the mobility of GI fellows when there is a match to the mobility without a
match. A GI fellow moves whenever the GI fellowship is at a different hospital than the
residency before the GI fellowship.
In Figure 2, the mobility over hospitals (Hosp) is the percentage of GI fellows that
change hospital after finishing their (mostly) internal medicine residency and starting the
gastroenterology fellowship. The mobility over City and State measures the percentage of
fellows who move to a different city and state, respectively.
                                                          
12 There is a potential bias in the data due to the fact that hospitals that change name due to mergers, etc.
are coded as different hospitals.  We address this problem below by also analyzing the data after removing
data involving the first three years that any GI fellowship (to remove spurious incidence of “mobility”
between a hospital and the same hospital under a different name), and find that this does not change any of
our results.16
Figure 2: The vertical lines indicate again the beginning and the end of the use of the
centralized match, measured in year of Fellowship completion.
The following Table 2 indicates average mobility (averages across years), where we also
divide the 12 years of the match in the first and the last six years (M1 and M2
respectively).
Mobility 77-88 80-88 (Pre) 89-94 (M1) 95-00 (M2) 89-00 (M) 01-03 (Post)
Hosp 0.578 0.605 0.656 0.710 0.683 0.614
City 0.477 0.502 0.534 0.588 0.561 0.530
State 0.375 0.392 0.407 0.460 0.433 0.433
Table 2
Table 3 provides the differences across mobility with p-values, where we use a two sided
Mann Whitney U test, with the proportion of mobility in each year as our data points.
Share of mobility of GI fellows for each year


















































The introduction of a centralized clearinghouse significantly increases mobility
across hospitals, across cities and across states. That this increase is gradual as measured
over the first and second six-year periods of the match conforms with experimental
results (Kagel and Roth 2000), in which the introduction of a centralized match only
gradually becomes fully used by participants. Mobility sharply declines after the demise
of the match lends strong support to the hypothesis that the increase in mobility during
match years in indeed due to the match, and not to a general change in mobility of
physicians over time.  This suggests that the centralized clearinghouse has an important
effect on the match that is produced, not only its timing.  This in turn supports the
hypothesis that the unraveled, early market is narrower in scope than the later market
conducted via the centralized match.
But there is another possible explanation for the increase in mobility during the
use of a centralized clearinghouse. It may be that when a centralized system is in place,
different internal medicine physicians, specifically physicians who have always been18
more mobile, choose to become gastroenterologists.  To control for this possibility, we
now compute for each GI fellow a measure of mobility that corresponds to a change in
city or state after finishing medical school and moving to the residency completed just
before entering their GI fellowship. For this purpose we discard all foreign graduate
students, reducing the sample to 6789 physicians.
13   (This measure will also allow us to
better interpret the absolute levels of mobility we find in moving from residency to
fellowship.)
The following graphs compare mobility from medical school to residency and
from residency to GI fellowship.  To keep track of the same individuals, they are always
tabulated in the year of completion of the GI fellowship. Since the students are not
employed by the medical schools, they always move at the institutional level, so we
compare mobility only over city and state.
                                                          
13 These are all physicians who studied in the US, Canada or Puerto Rico, whose fellowship programs are
represented in our data set.19
Figure 3a: Mobility of fellows who finish their GI fellowship in any given year
across cities.  The “City GI” line represents mobility across cities from residency to GI
fellowship (as in Figure 2), while “City IM” reflects, for the same fellows, mobility
between medical school and the last fellowship before GI (mostly IM: internal medicine).
The vertical lines represent the beginning and the end of the match.
Figure 3b: Same as Figure 3a, for mobility across states.
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First we note that, unsurprisingly, physicians become less mobile as they advance
in their careers. Second, there is no evidence that the change in mobility of GI fellows
during the centralized match is driven by an increase in mobile physicians choosing to
become Gastroenterologists. On the contrary, the mobility of fellows between medical
school and their fellowship before GI is, slightly, increasing over time. That is, even
though there is a striking decline in mobility of GI fellows before and after the match,
when the same individuals were younger, and entering their IM residencies, they showed
no difference in mobility, at either the city or state level.
This also makes clear why studying Gastroenterologists, for whom we have data
not only before the institution of a centralized match, but also after its demise, allows us
to separate changes in mobility due to changes over time from changes in mobility due to
the market mechanism in place.
Next we control for several potential biases that might appear in our data set, to
make sure that our results are not artifacts of the way the data were collected or coded.
First, note that for the year 2003 we have only 156 fellows as opposed to around
300 for the years 2001 and 2002. GI fellows who finish in 2003 start in 2000, so we
assume that the AMA did not receive notice from all hospitals yet. To control for the
possibility of a biased subset of universities that submit information about fellows on
time, we consider the mobility of GI fellows in the years 1980 to 2002 for only the
universities that report fellows in 2003.
14  For the years 2001 and 2002, mobility of
fellows at those hospitals is higher at every level (hospital, city and state), suggesting a
possible bias of the data point of 2003 against our hypothesis. Furthermore, analyzing the
                                                          
14 Since a bias might only occur for the year 2003, we are mainly concerned in replicating the effects of the
demise of the match, as opposed to the introduction of the match.21
effects of the failure of the match on mobility for only hospitals that report fellows in
2003, reveals patterns that closely follow the ones when we consider all hospitals.
15 
Another possible bias stems from the fact that due to the consolidation of
hospitals in the 90’s, some hospitals in our data set change their name and also receive a
new hospital code. Therefore it is possible that a physician who absolves her IM
residency and her GI fellowship at the same hospital, might still be coded as moving
hospitals, solely because her hospital changed its name. This bias would be an alternative
explanation for our findings of increased mobility during the match at the hospital level,
though of course not at the level of the city or the state.
To control for this source of bias we eliminate for each hospital the first three
years of observation. The proportion of GI fellows who finish their GI fellowship 3 years
after their last residency is always at least 70%. The results are comparable to our
previous table.
16
 Furthermore, we divide our sample into big and small hospitals (being a proxy
for more or less desirable hospitals, since tertiary hospitals tend to be both large and to
                                                          
15 The following table reports differences and significance levels when we only consider hospitals that have
fellows which finish in 2003. M1 refers to 1989-1994, M2 to 1995-2000 and Post to 2001-2003.
Difference M2 - M1 Post - M2  Post - M
Hospital 0.046 (.0782) -0.083 (.0389) -0.060 (.0606)
City 0.068 (.0065) -0.054 (.1213) -0.020 (.6650)
State 0.060 (.0163) -0.013 (.7963) 0.017 (.3865)
16 The following table reports differences when we remove the first three years of each hospital. The results
are comparable, though significance (at the level of hospital, city and state) is a bit lower (note we use a
two-sided test).





































deal with a wider variety of diseases). We find that larger hospitals hire significantly
fewer local fellows than small hospitals (at the hospital, city and state level). Furthermore
the effects of the match are larger and more significant for large universities than for
small universities.
17
To test whether the match has a differential impact for different fellows we
divided our sample between men and women, who first were about 5% to up to 15% of
the GI fellows. We find that women are less mobile than men, though the match has no
effect on the differential of mobility.
Conclusions
This paper provides the first nonexperimental evidence that the use of a
centralized match has an effect on the kinds of matchings produced by the market. When
gastroenterology fellowship positions were offered through a centralized clearinghouse,
the market became significantly more national than it was before the match, or since its
demise. The mobility of GI fellows, as measured by whether their GI fellowship is in the
same hospital, city or state as their former residency, significantly increased with the use
of a centralized match.
Our results have implications for models of matching and the effects of
unraveling. When markets unravel to very early appointment dates, the scope of the
market is reduced. Anecdotally, studies of unraveled markets suggest this is because
                                                          
17 To determine the size we consider for each hospital the average number of fellows for all the years in
which the hospital had fellows. The average number of positions per year is 1.79, the median 1.53. We first
divided our sample in hospitals of size below or above median. The universities of size below median have23
when appointments have to be made very early, participants seem to rely more on their
personal networks (see e.g. Avery et al. 2001).
18
There are several possible roles for such networks when appointments are early:
they can be sources of otherwise scarce information, they can facilitate transactions when
they must be completed quickly, and they can enhance the credibility of commitments
made years in advance.
The earlier a market unravels, the less information will be available about
candidates, and the more market firms may have to rely on additional, trustworthy
sources of information about their prospective applicants. Clearly, GI training directors
may be able to receive insider information about internal medicine residents from their
own hospital.
In addition, a hospital may be much faster in countering a short fuse offer for a
candidate from their own hospital, about whom they have already a lot of information,
and who they can interview, if necessary, on short notice, than for a candidate from
outside, whom they would first have to arrange a flyout interview.
Finally, superior information about candidates within a network may not only
concern the ability of the applicant, but also their preferences about pursuing a GI
fellowship in that particular hospital. Indeed Roth and Xing 1997, observed that
psychology training directors prefer to make offers to lower ranked candidates if those
candidates expressed a credible strong preference for this specific training program.
Such information may be more accurate and more easily available for fellows from the
                                                                                                                                                                            
less than 20% of the fellows. Therefore we also divided our sample in the 100 largest universities that have
about 50% of the fellows, and the smaller ones.24
same hospital. Furthermore, not only information about the reliability of promises that a
candidate would accept this offer when made, but also enforcement of this promise may
be easier, when the applicant is part of a local network. For example, an internal medicine
training director who knows that a fellow accepted a position in the same hospital, may
refuse to provide information to other potential employers.
The exact reasons for the demise of the centralized match for gastroenterologists
remains an open question.  The proximate cause seems to have been the shock to the
market from the administrative decision to reduce the number and increase the lengths of
GI fellowships required for board certification.  Since that time, the number of positions
has again stabilized, raising the question of  whether this profession would be ready to try
using the match again. The results of the present study suggest that reintroducing a
centralized match would increase the scope of the market and the mobility of
gastroenterologists, as well as allowing matches to be made after more information has
become available.
                                                                                                                                                                            
18 In a personal communication, Wing Suen has informed us that he and Hao Li and Ettore Damiano are
working on a model of search, in which search costs may be distance related, that may be able to
accommodate some of the phenomena reported here.25
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